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Abstract  
 
This paper provides a theoretical and empirical investigation of the effects of HIV/AIDS on community-
level informal financial institutions such as rotating savings and credit associations.  Our theoretical model 
illustrates that the mortality risk implied by the HIV/AIDS pandemic can put a significant strain on such 
institutions by shortening time horizons and weakening expectations of reciprocity on the part of 
participants.  Mortality thus implies a community-wide externality, as even households that are not directly 
impacted by the disease are nonetheless adversely affected by living in high prevalence communities.  
Using panel data from the high-prevalence area of KwaZulu Natal, South Africa, we investigate the effects 
of community-level mortality on the rate of participation in community level financial and other types of 
groups.  We find that mortality at the community level substantially reduces the prevalence of group 
membership, and that the differential impacts of mortality on different types of groups are consistent with 
the predictions of our theoretical model. 
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1. Introduction 
 
For many of the world’s poor, community-level informal arrangements provide an 
important source of access to financial services.  A vivid illustration of the important role 
of these institutions and the wide variety of needs they serve for the poor is provided by 
Collins et. al. (2009).  Village-based savings clubs and lending groups provide not only 
credit for investment or other large purchases, but also play a crucial role in facilitating 
insurance and consumption smoothing in the face of fluctuating incomes for the poorest 
of the poor.   
These types of institutions share a common rationale that explains their existence and 
sometimes persistence even in the face of formal alternatives.  In particular, the 
sanctioning power and informational advantages of the community can serve as a basis 
for effectively enforcing agreements.  Community-level punishments such as ostracism 
or loss of reputation incurred from breach of an informal agreement can serve as 
powerful deterrents.  Particularly where the state is weak, these informal sanctions may 
be more effective than the legal recourse available to formal service providers.  Similarly, 
community members may have access to information (e.g., creditworthiness) about one 
another through repeated interactions or networks that would be costly or impossible for 
impersonal entities to obtain. 
This paper will argue that a heretofore unexplored impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic 
in sub-Saharan Africa is that it reduces access to informal financial services by 
weakening the basis for community-level contract enforcement.  The central argument is 
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that premature mortality constitutes a risk of informal contractual non-compliance- an 
individual who has agreed to repay a loan or fulfill some other obligation is unable to do 
so if he or she dies unexpectedly.  This risk of default is one that the community cannot 
mitigate via the threat of sanctions.  This is of particular concern as the viability of these 
institutions may in some cases depend on the deterrent power of such sanctions ensuring 
very high rates of compliance. 
We find empirical support for the assertion that mortality weakens community-level 
financial institutions using panel data from KwaZulu Natal, South Africa, an area of high 
HIV prevalence.  Our data show that high mortality is associated with less participation 
in the types of community groups that involve informal contracts.  However, mortality 
does not inhibit participation in other types of community groups, which is consistent 
with the hypothesis that mortality acts on community institutions by weakening informal 
contract enforcement.  
In the next section, we discuss conceptual issues and provide a review of the relevant 
literature.  We then provide a theoretical model that illustrates the effects of community-
level mortality on community-level institutions.  We present our empirical results in the 
next section, followed by policy implications and recommendations for further research. 
2. Community Level Contracting and Mortality 
 
2.1 Community level institutions and mortality 
The informal institutions that are the subject of this paper are underpinned by 
rules that are made and enforced at the level of the community, as opposed to formal, 
legal institutions underpinned by rules at the level of the state.  As Bowles and Gintis 
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(2002) elaborate, institutions based on community-level rules may be more effective or 
efficient than formal alternatives in circumstances where circumstances where formal 
contracting is difficult or costly, or where private information is important.   They 
identify three characteristics of communities in particular that can put them at an 
advantage in these situations.  First, transactions that take place within communities can 
entail the scope for repeated interactions.  This gives rise to a particular set of incentives 
to cooperate over time that would not exist in a perfectly anonymous market.  The 
potential benefit to future cooperation or the threat of terminating the relationship or 
retaliation can thus add an element of self-enforcement to contracts.  This has been 
observed by Maher (1995), who notes that among a sample of European firms that extend 
supplier credit, many report that they would not pursue legal action in the event of 
default. 
Secondly, repeated interactions allow community members to have information 
about one another that might not be available publically.  For example, community 
members may be able to assess one another’s creditworthiness more effectively than a 
credit bureau could.  Monitoring costs and principle-agent problems can also be reduced 
by information that may be available to the community, but not the market. 
Finally, communities imply a scope for imposing punishments to enforce rules.  
Ostracism and the threat of social sanctions or loss of social status can be powerful 
deterrents to opportunistic behavior.  Contracts enforced by community level sanctions 
may thus be advantageous when formal contracting is poorly enforced, costly, or 
inflexible.  The importance of social sanctions has been observed by other authors as 
well.  Fehr and Gachter (2000) find experimental evidence that introducing the ability to 
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punish free riders improves cooperation in coordination games.  In a study of rural 
Kenya, Miguel and Gugerty (2005) find that communities with a greater scope for 
imposing social sanctions on members experience improved public goods provision.   
Where HIV/AIDS introduces a substantial mortality risk to the members of the 
community, all three of these advantages of community governance structures are 
undermined.  The risk of mortality to one’s transaction partner means that repeated 
interaction is less likely- the expected number of interactions with a given transaction 
partner is smaller than it would otherwise be.  The associated costs and benefits that 
would occur as a result of future interactions are consequently reduced, and hence the 
incentive to behave opportunistically in the present is increased.   
Similarly, the community’s advantage in terms of information becomes less 
valuable.  In the context of credit, for example, high mortality introduces a risk of default 
that is unrelated to one’s trustworthiness or other characteristics that can be assessed by 
the community.  To the extent that mortality is unpredictable, the community’s relative 
advantage over a formal financial institution in assessing creditworthiness is thus 
reduced.  
The sanctioning power of the community is also affected by high levels of 
mortality.  Informal punishments often imply a time dimension- the costs of social 
ostracism, for example, are experienced over a period of time rather than instantaneously.  
In addition, in the case of contracts that entail some action to be taken by the participants 
in some future state, mortality introduces a risk of non-compliance that sanctions cannot 
deter.  This is potentially significant, as in many cases the threat of sanctions is sufficient 
to ensure high levels of compliance- for example, a number of authors have noted that 
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default in the context of rotating savings and credit associations in exceedingly rare (e.g., 
van den Brink and Chavas 1997).  To the extent that the rationale behind these 
institutions depends on high levels of compliance, their viability could be threatened by 
introducing a risk of non-compliance where none had existed before.   
 
2.2 ASCAs and ROSCAs 
An important function that these community-level institutions have been observed 
to serve is in the provision of financial services to community members.  Two types of 
these institutions that have received significant attention in the literature and are the focus 
of the empirical analysis in this paper are Accumulated Savings and Credit Associations 
(ASCAs), and Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs).  In an ASCA, 
members contribute savings to a common fund, which is then lent out at interest.  The 
responsibility for disbursing and collecting loans typically falls to the individual 
members, and the proceeds are divided up among the members.  Hence, the ASCA acts 
as an interest-bearing savings vehicle.   
ROSCAs are a community-level institution that have been observed in a wide 
variety of contexts in the developing world (Armendairiz and Morduch 2007).  The basic 
structure of a ROSCA is that a group of individuals commit to gathering at regular 
intervals and contribute a predetermined amount of money into a fund.  At each meeting, 
the fund is allocated to single member of group, the meetings continue until each member 
has been allocated the pot once.  ROSCAs may repeat over several cycles, and the 
method of choosing the order of allocation varies.  A number of motivations for joining 
ROSCAs have been noted in the literature, including financing the purchase of lumpy 
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consumer durables (Besley, Coate, and Loury 1993), shielding savings from claims by 
relatives (Anderson and Baland 2002), and as a commitment device to overcome time-
inconsistent preferences (Ambec and Treich 2007,  Gugerty 2007). 
Both of these institutions imply a scope for opportunistic behavior and hence an 
important role for community level sanctions as a deterrent.  In an ASCA, where debt 
collection falls to individual members, they have a pecuniary incentive to withhold 
repayments from the group.  Similarly, in a ROSCA, once an individual has been 
allocated the pot, they can profit by failing to attend and contribute at subsequent 
meetings of the group.  Anderson et. al. (2009) demonstrate theoretically that a ROSCA 
structure cannot be incentive compatible for all members in the absence of some form of 
sanctioning to deter this behavior. 
 
2.3 Empirical literature on HIV/AIDS and community spillovers and social capital 
The effects of HIV/AIDS on these types of institutions has yet to receive explicit 
attention in the literature.  However, two recent empirical studies find evidence that is 
consistent with our central thesis.  Jayne et. al. (2006) consider the impacts of mortality 
(to which HIV/AIDS is a major contributor) at the level of the community in Zambia.  
They find that with higher rates of mortality exhibit lower productivity, income, and area 
under cultivation.  However, they do not investigate the mechanisms by which this might 
occur.  Intriguingly, they also find that the reduction in income associated with mortality 
is of greater magnitude in communities that have experienced greater rainfall variability.  
An interpretation of their results that is consistent with the approach here is that mortality 
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weakens informal risk sharing networks, leading to greater vulnerability to rainfall 
shocks.  
Similarly suggestive cross-country evidence is provided by David (2007).  
Controlling for a variety of factors, he finds that incidence of HIV/AIDS has a strong 
inverse relationship with subjective measures of trust.  He thus concludes that mortality 
acts to weaken social capital, and hypothesizes that a mechanism by which this occurs is 
through the strain on traditional social networks that mitigate economic shocks- i.e., by 
reducing the strength of informal agreements such as those enforced at the community 
level. 
 
3. Theoretical Model 
In this section, we present a model of community-level institutional formation that 
allows us to incorporate the effects of community level-mortality.  The basic structure of 
our model is that some subset of the members of a community may choose to form a 
group G for the purpose of facilitating institutional arrangements between members.  
Members of the group play a two-stage game: the first stage follows a Prisonner’s 
Dilemma, in which players choose to Cooperate or Default, while in the second stage 
those who played Defect in the first period incur an informal punishment.  Individuals 
discount second period outcomes according to heterogeneous discount rates.  The group 
is selective, and chooses its members to maximize the payoff to Cooperating according to 
the information that is available to it.  Individuals may opt out of participating in the 
group if their expected payoff is negative.  Our focus in on the existence of Nash 
equilibria in which the group size is non-zero, and the size of the group in equilibrium.   
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3.1 Set-Up 
 
A community consists of N individuals { }1,..., N who are assumed to have 
homogeneous preferences, with the exception of heterogeneous discount factors 
[0,1]iδ ∈ .  Some subset of these individuals may choose to form a group G.  Each i G∈  
chooses between two strategies, Cooperate (C) and Default (D).  As in the standard 
Prisoner’s Dilemma, players obtain a benefit from Cooperating but face an additional 
incentive to Default.  The payoffs to each strategy are as follows:  
( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )
1 ( )
1 ( )
i
i i
f C q B n q c
f D q B n P c
γ
ε δ
= − − −
= − + − −  
Where: 
q is the proportion of Defaulters in the group, 
( )B n  is the benefit that is derived from participating in the group, with B an increasing 
function of the number of group members n that is continuous, concave, and everywhere 
twice differentiable, 
γ is the cost to Cooperators of other Defaulting group members,   
c is a cost associated with participating, 
ε is the premium associated with Defaulting, and  
P is a punishment imposed on Defaulters in the second period,  
With A, γ, ε, P, c ≥ 0. 
We can thus write the difference in payoffs between Cooperate and Default as 
( ) ( ) ( )1i i if D f C q q Pε γ δ− = − + −  
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It follows that an individual’s optimal strategy depends on the proportion of 
defaulters in the group as well as her discount rate; in particular the optimal strategy is to 
Cooperate iff: 
( )1
i
q q
P
ε γδ − +≥  
The distribution of discount factors is assumed to be such that there is a 
probability mass of k at 0, and elsewhere the distribution is uniform on [0,1].  Thus, the 
probability distribution of the discount rates is given by 
 ( )
 if 0
(1 ) if 0 < 1
0 if  > 1  
i
i i i
i
k
g k
δ
δ δ δ
δ
=⎧⎪= − ≤⎨⎪⎩
 
This implies that there is some proportion k of the population who completely 
discount period two, and thus have only a one-period time horizon.  We take this 
parameter k to represent the level of mortality within the community.  Conceptually, an 
individual who suffers premature mortality is not able to live up to the terms of her 
informal contract.  From the standpoint of the group, this is equivalent to Defaulting.  
We assume perfect information except with regard to discount factors.  While the 
distribution g is public information, each individual’s discount factor is assumed to be 
private information.  Associated with each individual is a publically observable 
“indicator” *δˆ .  This indicator is characterized by a parameter 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 such that  
( ) ( ) ( )ˆ ˆPr 1i i igδ δ θ θ δ= = + −  
Thus, the nature of the indicator is such that it “correctly” indicates and 
individual’s true discount factor with probability θ, and “incorrectly” returns a random 
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draw from the community’s distribution g with probability 1- θ1.  In the case where θ = 1, 
for example, the indicator is perfectly accurate and discount factors are in effect 
publically observable.  Conversely, where θ = 0, the indicator conveys no information 
about an individual’s discount rate beyond knowledge of g.  For intermediate values of θ, 
we can say that ( ) ( )ˆ1 Pr Pri i i aδ δ δ> = > = for all ˆ[0,1], ia a δ∈ ≠ . 
Our solution concept is what we term a “cooperative equilibrium.”  We 
conceptualize cooperative equilibria in terms of an optimal decision rule for inclusion 
into the group G.  The optimal decision rule is expressed in terms of a threshold indicator 
level *δˆ , where any member i of the community for whom *ˆ ˆiδ δ≥  is accepted, and others 
are rejected.  We define a cooperative equilibrium as one for which the optimal decision 
rule generates a subset G that maximizes the average first-period payoff to each member 
of G who plays Cooperate, such that the expected payoff for all participants in the group 
is greater than zero.  Thus, in a cooperative equilibrium the threshold indicator level *δˆ is 
chosen to maximize the benefits to the group, subject to the constraint that all the invited 
members wish to play.  If no decision rule can produce an expected payoff greater than 
zero, we term the result an “autarky equilibrium.” 
We can write the optimal decision rule problem as follows: 
(3) ( ) ( )
*ˆ
*
*
max  (1 ) ( )
. .
ˆ ˆ. Pr
(1 ) ˆ ˆ. q Pr |
. (1 ) ( ) 0
i
i i
q B n q c
s t
i n N
q qii
R
iii q B n q c
δ
γ
δ δ
ε γδ δ δ
γ
− − −
= ≥
− +⎛ ⎞= < ≥⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
− − − ≥
 
                                                 
1 Note that an “incorrect” indicator may still in fact correspond to the individual’s true discount rate δi if the 
random draw from g happens to be δi. 
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Where a solution to (3) exists, it is the Cooperative Equilibrium.  If no solution 
exists, the autarky equilibrium obtains.  We can write n and q as functions of *δˆ , so that 
(3) becomes: 
( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )
*
* * *
ˆ
* * *
ˆ ˆ ˆmax  1 1 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ. . 1 1 1 0
q B N k q c
s t q B N k q c
δ
δ δ δ γ
δ δ δ γ
− − − − −
− − − − − ≥
 
So that if a Cooperative Equilibrium exists, *δˆ  must satisfy the conditions: 
(4.i) 
( )( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( )* ** **ˆ ˆ1 1 ˆ ˆ1 1 1 1ˆB N k qN k q B N knδ δδ γ δδ∂ − − ∂− − = − − −∂ ∂  
(4.ii) ( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )* * *ˆ ˆ ˆ1 1 1 0q B N k q cδ δ δ γ− − − − − ≥  
 
3.2 Assumptions 
For analytical tractability and simplicity, we make a number of assumptions.   
Assumption 1a: P ε>  
Assumption 1b: γ ε>  
 
Assumption 1a is needed to guarantee that the second-period punishment can potentially 
deter Default behavior.  Without Assumption 1a, even the most patient player would 
always prefer Default to Cooperate, and no Cooperative Equilibrium could exist. 
 
Proposition 12: At k = 0, there exists some N such that for N N≥  , a unique Cooperative 
equilibrium exists for any value of θ.  
                                                 
2 Proofs of all propositions and lemmas are provided in the appendix 
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Assumption 2a: N N≥  
Assumption 2b: (1)B c<  
 
Lemma 1: For any allowable parameterization of the model, there is some critical value 
( )0,1Ck ∈   such that for any Ck k≤  the Cooperative Equilibrium exists, while for 
Ck k≥ the Autarky Equilibrium prevails.   
Assumption 3: ( ) ( )B n B n
n N
γ∂ +≤∂ for all 0 n N≤ ≤  
Lemma 2: Assumption 3 is sufficient to guarantee that adding Defaulters to the group 
always reduces the payoff to the Cooperating group members.   
Where information is imperfect, the optimal decision rule may nonetheless result 
in admission of some Defaulters to the group.  However, Assumption 3 guarantees that 
inclusion of these Defaulters is always a welfare loss for the group. 
 
3.2 Cooperative Equilibria 
In this section, we characterize the nature of Cooperative Equilibria under 
different information regimes; i.e., under different assumptions regarding the indicator 
accuracy parameter θ.   First, we consider the case where individuals have no information 
about each other’s discount factors so that θ = 0.  Next, we consider the case where θ = 1, 
so that discount rates are in effect public information.  Finally, we look at solutions for 
intermediate values of θ.  Throughout, our focus is on the dynamics of the model as k 
increases.  The main theoretical results are presented as a series of propositions with 
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proofs provided in the Appendix.  We discuss the intuition and interpretation in the 
context of graphical results presented in Figures 1 and 2. 
 
Proposition 2a: Where θ = 0, let ( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )1
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
C B N c P B Nk
B N c B N P
ε γ γ ε
ε γ γ ε
− + − − += − − − + − .   For 
1Ck k≤ k a Cooperative Equilibrium exists with group size N, while for 1Ck k> no 
Cooperative Equilibrium exists. 
Proposition 2b: Over the range k <  kC1, the threshold indicator *ˆ 0δ =  
 
Proposition 3a: Where θ = 1, let ( ) ( )2 11C
Pk B c
P Nε
−⎛ ⎞= − ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
, where B-1 is the inverse of 
B. For 2Ck k≤ , a Cooperative Equilibrium exists with a group size n* that is decreasing in 
k at a rate of 1 N
P
ε⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ .  For 
2Ck k>  no cooperative equilibrium exists. 
Proposition 3b: Over the range k <  kC2 ,  the threshold indicator is *ˆ
P
εδ =  
Proposition 3c: kC2 > kC1 
 
Proposition 4a: Where 0 < θ < 1, let 3Ck be the value of k such that at the *δˆ that satisfies 
(4.1), constraint (4.i) holds with equality.  For 3Ck k≤ a Cooperative Equilibrium exists 
with group size n* that is weakly decreasing in k. For 3Ck k>  no cooperative equilibrium 
exists. 
Proposition 4b: Over the range 0 < k < kC3, the threshold indicator is weakly increasing in 
k. 
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Proposition 4c: kC2 > kC3 > kC1 
 
3.2 Graphical Interpretation 
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate these results under a parameterized version of the model.   
Figure 1 shows the threshold *δˆ  and the default rate q as k increases for each of the three 
cases, while Figure 2 shows the optimal group size n.  In the θ = 0 case, the group faces 
no tradeoff in its choice of *δˆ - increasing *δˆ does not have the effect of reducing the rate 
of Default, since a lower *δˆ  is not associated with higher propensity to Default.  Hence 
the group cannot improve on a fully inclusive decision rule where *δˆ = 0 and the group 
size consists of all N members of the community.  As k increases, the payoff for group 
members decreases as more and more Default occurs.  Once the payoff for group 
members is negative, there is no longer a Cooperative Equilibrium and the group size 
falls to zero. 
Conversely, where θ = 1 so that discount factors are publically observable, the 
optimal decision rule is to exclude any member of the community whose incentive is to 
Default and accept all other members.  Hence, there is no Default in the group, and the 
threshold indicator *ˆ
P
εδ = , the discount factor at which an individual will Default when 
all other group members cooperate.  As k increases, the community members whose 
discount factors fall to zero are excluded, so that the group size decreases in k.  At some 
point, the group size becomes small enough that fixed costs c of participating exceed the 
benefits for even the most patient group members, and there is no longer a Cooperative 
Equilibrium. 
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An intermediate information regime such that θ = 0.5 is also illustrated in Figures 
1 and 2:  Unlike the previous two cases, *δˆ is increasing in k.  The intuition is as follows: 
at a given threshold *δˆ , an  increase in k causes an exogenous increase in the Default rate 
q.  This is because accepted group members whose indicators are inaccurate are now 
more likely to be Defaulters.  In turn, an increase in k serves to further increase the 
Default rate by reducing the Cooperation threshold.  A greater proportion of Defaulters in 
the group increases the incentive to Default, so that the marginal group member’s optimal 
strategy shifts from Cooperate to Default.   Thus, it is optimal to increase the threshold 
indicator.  As k increases, the optimal group size thus shrinks as the rate of Default 
increases, so as in the previous two cases there is some point at which a Cooperative 
Equilibrium can no longer be sustained.  As one might expect, the more accurate the 
signal, the closer the dynamics correspond to perfect information case.  
Note that the contours of the model are consistent with the structure of both 
ASCAs and ROSCAs described in the previous section.  Both institutions imply an 
informal contract with a pecuniary incentive to default that is deterred by informal 
sanctions, and the efficacy of this mechanism is threatened by mortality within the 
community.  In an ASCA, the contract arises from the fact that individual members 
collect payments for loans they have made with the group fund.   Thus, there is an 
incentive to withhold the repayments on loans that they have collected from the rest of 
the group, while the premature death of a member can adversely affect the group if that 
member has made outstanding loans that have not yet been collected.  In addition, high 
mortality in the community may result in lower repayment rates on the loans of the 
central fund my group members.    
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In the context of a ROSCA, once an individual has been allocated the fund, she has a 
pecuniary incentive stop attending meetings and contributing to the fund.  Such default is 
costly to the rest of the group, as it reduces the size of the pot for remaining members and 
may threaten the group with dissolution.  Anderson et. al. (2009) demonstrate that social 
sanctions to deter such behavior are necessary for a ROSCA to be viable.  Thus, as a 
source of default that is immune to sanctions, mortality threatens these institutions. 
4. Data and Econometric Approach 
The data requirements for a definitive empirical analysis of our theoretical model are 
formidable.  To do so, we would need detailed time series data on membership at the 
level of the informal institutions themselves, which would also have to drawn from a 
location and timeframe over which the rate of mortality varies significantly across 
communities.  To our knowledge, such data do not exist.  However, an existing dataset, 
the KwaZulu Natal Income Dynamics Study (KIDS), has a number of desirable features 
for our purposes.  It is a panel survey that spans a timeframe over which the rate of 
HIV/AIDS increased dramatically, resulting in substantial variation in community 
mortality rates.  In addition, it contains information on informal institutions and both the 
household and community levels.  Thus, we employ the KIDS dataset to investigate some 
of the implications of our theoretical model.       
 
4.1 Data: general description 
The KIDS dataset is a panel study collected in the province of KwaZulu Natal, 
South Africa over the period 1993-2004.  It contains a range detailed socioeconomic and 
demographic information intended to facilitate policy-relevant research, particularly in 
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terms of the dynamics of poverty. The initial 1993 round surveyed 1,354 households 
drawn from 67 communities; representatives of 74% of the original sample were 
successfully re-interviewed in both 1998 and 2004.  Where core members of the 1993 
households split off and formed or joined new households, these new households were 
also tracked and incorporated into the later rounds.  The 1998 and 2004 surveys include 
questions on membership in a variety of community groups.3  Since we are interested in 
the impact of community-level mortality and we can only identify households with their 
original communities, we omit households that have relocated to new communities 
during the survey.  The implications of omitting these households are discussed below.  
After adjusting for this and other data irregularities, we are left with 673 households 
distributed over 62 communities.  
The location and timeframe are ideal for studying the effects of HIV/AIDS-
related mortality on community level institutions.  The pandemic induced a massive 
increase in adult mortality over this period; the probability that a 15-year-old in KwaZulu 
Natal would not survive to age 49 increased from 27.9% in 1998 to 70.8% in 2004 
(Dorrington et. al. 2002).  While we do not observe group sizes directly, the data do 
contain information on membership in informal institutions at the household level, as 
well as the number of different types of institutions in each community.  We thus 
estimate the impact of community level-mortality on the likelihood that a household 
belongs to an informal institution.  We further estimate a proxy for average group size, 
                                                 
3 The 1998 survey also obtains retrospective data on group membership in 1993.  However, recall bias 
appears to be a significant problem for investigating the dynamics of group membership here.  For 
example, only 1 household restrospectively reported membership in stokvels in 1993 that it had left in 
1998.  Conversely, there were 100 cases of households reporting membership in stokvels in 1998 that they 
had left by 2004.  Hence, we omit the recall data from our analysis. 
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and estimate the effect on the total number of groups and the average groups size at the 
level of the community. 
 
For each community, we calculate the rate of mortality among adults aged 15-49 in 
the sample over the periods 1993-1998 and 1998-2004.  The results confirm a dramatic 
increase in mortality after 1998, as prime age mortality nearly triples.  Summary statistics 
for community level mortality and other variables of interest are reported in table 1.   
 
4.2 Data: Informal institutions 
Our data contain information on membership in a stokvels, a South African term for a 
general category of informal financial institution.  Stokvels can take a variety of forms- 
ASCAs and ROSCAs are two of the most commonly noted in the literature but the term 
encompasses a wide variety of arrangements.  Stokvels are widespread in the study area; 
25.1 % of households in our sample reported membership in at least one. 
 
4.3 Household level econometric approach and estimation results 
At the level of the household, our empirical strategy is to estimate the probability 
that at least one member of a household belongs to a particular type of group as a 
function of the level of mortality in the community.  We would like to control for both 
household and other community-level characteristics to the greatest extent possible, and 
hence employ panel data methods.  This presents an econometric difficulty in terms of 
how to eliminate unobserved heterogeneity in the context of a binary response dependent 
variable.  Our preferred approach is fixed effects conditional logit proposed by 
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Chamberlain (1980).  We prefer the conditional logit model to a probit specification 
because the latter implies a number of assumptions that are problematic given our data4.   
The empirical approach is to condition the observed pattern of responses over 
time on the total number of responses within the panel unit.  In our case, there are only 
two time periods, so that the model is:  
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
1 2 1 2 12
2 1 2
1 2 1 2 12
exp
( 1| , , 1)
1 exp
i i j j
i i i
i i j j
X X Z Z
P g X Z g g
X X Z Z
β β
β β
− + −= + = = + − + −  
and 
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
1 2 1 2 12
1 1 2
1 2 1 2 12
exp
( 1| , , 1) 1
1 exp
i i j j
i i i
i i j j
X X Z Z
P g X Z g g
X X Z Z
β β
β β
− + −= + = = − + − + −  
Where: 
 git is an indicator of whether household i belonged to group type g at time t, 
Xit is a vector of household-level time varying characteristics,  
Zjt is a vector of cluster-level time varying characteristics including mortality, 
β1 and β2 are vectors of parameters to be estimated.   
In effect, the approach is to restrict attention to households that were members of 
a group in one period but not the other.  We then compare households that joined a group 
between 1998 and 2004 to those that exited groups between 1998 and 2004 in order to 
see whether community level mortality and our other controls is associated with group 
exit. 
                                                 
4 Using probit necessitates a random as opposed to fixed effects panel approach, as parameters cannot be 
estimated consistently under a probit specification with fixed effects.  The main disadvantage of the 
random effects probit model is that it requires the assumption of independence of the unobservables and the 
explanatory variables (Wooldridge 2001).  In our case, this is particularly problematic: for example, the 
household level incidence of prime-age mortality variable (PAM) is almost certainly related to unobserved 
household characteristics. 
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The main disadvantage to this approach is that it omits households that were 
members of a group in either both periods or neither period.  This gives rise to concern 
that our results might be biased because we are considering only a subset of the 
observations.  To allay this concern, we also estimate a linear probability model, which 
allows to incorporate the entire sample.  Though linear probability models are 
problematic for statistical inference, parameter estimates are nonetheless consistent and 
unbiased.  Thus, this model presents a useful robustness check on the conditional logit 
results. 
Estimation results with stokvel participation as the group type using conditional 
logit are presented in the first row of table 2.  Cluster level mortality is negative and 
significant. The linear probability model estimates shown in the second row confirm this 
result.  The only other control variable that is significant is household level expenditure 
growth.  Since we have controlled for cluster level expenditure growth, the interpretation 
is that households that have done well relative to other households in their community are 
more likely to join stokvels. 
Our results show that living in a high-mortality community reduces stokvel 
participation.  This consistent with our theoretical prediction that mortality leads to 
higher default rates and hence greater selectivity on the part of the institutions.   It is 
worth noting that in terms of the incentive structure in our model, these results can be 
thought of as a lower bound on the true impact of mortality, since as noted not all of the 
institutions classified as stokvels conform to our theoretical set-up.   
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4.4 Alternative Explanations 
Here, we consider two alternative explanations for the findings in the previous 
section.  First, while model pertains to the “supply” of institutional arrangements, it could 
be that demand side factors are in fact driving the results.  If living in a high mortality 
community reduces demand for the services that stokvels provide, this could explain the 
observed relationship between mortality and participation.   
We argue that we can reject this explanation because of the lack of significance of 
the household-level PAM coefficient in model 1.  If mortality were acting on stokvel 
participation by reducing demand, we would expect to see households that have suffered 
deaths to be less likely to be stokvel members than those that have not.  As this is not the 
case, we can rule out this type of demand-side effect. 
Secondly, our findings could be driven by other time-varying omitted variables.  
That is, there may be some unaccounted-for factor not captured by our panel data that is 
correlated with cluster-level mortality and leads to reduced participation in stokvels.  For 
example, mortality in the community may imply an increase in the marginal value of time 
as community members care for the sick, which could lead to lower rates of participation 
in group activities such as stokvels.  While we cannot completely rule out this possibility, 
we can investigate an important category of this type of effect by estimating our equation 
using other types of groups as the dependent variable.   
We observe a variety of non-financial community institutions.  These include 
trade associations and farmer’s organizations, as well as civic groups such as school, 
water, and development committees.  Also included are groups with a social or 
recreational purpose such as music and sports clubs.  20.2% of the study households 
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belonged to these types of groups in 1998, this increased to 26.2% in 2004.  A final 
category of community-level institutions comprises religious groups such as churches.  
Membership in these groups increased dramatically over the study period, from 52.3% of 
the sample in 1998 to 97.9% in 20045.  
Models 3-8 show the results of estimating our models with burial societies, non-
financial secular groups, and religious groups respectively.   In no case does community-
level mortality lead to lower participation rates.  We can thus rule out any time-varying 
unobserved variable that leads to reduced participation in community-level institutions in 
general, as opposed to stokvels in particular.  We note that household expenditure growth 
is significant in all of the regressions, suggesting that relatively fortunate households are 
more likely to join groups in general. 
Interestingly, model (7) shows that cluster level mortality is positively associated 
with religious group membership.  An intriguing (though speculative) explanation for this 
result that is consistent with our analysis relates to the potential substitutability of social 
capital.  Participation in a community-level institution may be motivated not only by the 
specific purpose of that institution, but also by the desire to deepen social relationships 
more broadly- that is, to build social capital.  This motivation has been cited in research 
on stokvels (Verhoef 2001).  In communities where mortality causes contracting 
institutions such as stokvels to become more exclusive and risky, individuals may try to 
build social capital through more accepting and potentially less costly types of 
institutions such as religious groups.       
A final concern that we address here is the potential for bias due to attrition and/or 
migration.  To the extent that households that move or drop out of the sample have 
                                                 
5 A slight change in format of the questionnaire may account for part of this difference 
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systematically different propensities for mortality or joining groups compared to our 
sample, this would   We re-estimate models 1 and 2 with additional variables for cluster-
level attrition and outmigration.  We omit the results, but in none of the estimations were 
any of these variables significant, nor does their inclusion substantially alter the statistical 
significance of the cluster-level mortality coefficient. 
 
4.4  Further Evidence on the Relationship Between Mortality and Stokvel Participation  
In the previous section, we showed that households in high-mortality 
communities are less likely to be members of stokvels.  According to the theoretical 
model in section 3, this could potentially occur in two ways.  Stokvels may become 
gradually more exclusive, as the optimal threshold for inclusion increases with mortality.  
Alternatively, at high enough levels of k a cooperative equilibrium may cease to exist and 
the group may dissolve.  The KIDS dataset includes information on the number of groups 
of various types that serve each of the 62 communities in the survey.  We thus estimate 
the effects of mortality on the number of stokvels at the community level. 
The results of our community-level fixed effects regression appear in table 3.  Our 
sample size is small, as we have only 124 data points upon which to rely.  Nonetheless, 
the community fixed effects explain a substantial portion of the variation, and the 
coefficients of the model are jointly significant at .05.  The coefficient on prime age 
mortality is positive and insignificant.  Thus, higher mortality communities do not appear 
to have fewer stokvels.  The implication, then, is that our household-level results are 
driven by existing stokvels admitting fewer members, rather than dissolving.    
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5 Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Research 
Our findings suggest a heretofore unexplored impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic that 
has important implications for policy.  In high prevalence areas, programs designed to 
mitigate the effects of the HIV/AIDS pandemic must consider not only those directly 
affected by the disease, but the broader community as well.  Even for those who are not 
directly affected by disease, the pandemic may weaken the informal institutional 
arrangements upon which many poor households rely.  Access to credit, insurance, and 
other financial services may suffer as a result.  
Our results also have implications for the study of institutional change.  A number of 
authors have pointed out that social relations in developing countries are complex and 
interconnected.  While this is undoubtedly the case, our results demonstrate that an 
analysis of the underlying incentives of a particular type of institutional arrangement can 
nonetheless provide useful insights.  
Finally, our results suggest that further empirical study of these issues is warranted.  
While our empirical evidence has focused on rotating savings and credit associations, a 
broad range of institutional arrangements such as mutual insurance networks and 
informal lending are liable to be subject to the same effects.  More detailed data at the 
level of the institutions themselves would allow for the theoretical findings in this paper 
to be tested explicitly, and the magnitude and economic implications of the effects of 
HIV/AIDS on weakening community-level contract enforcement to be more precisely 
understood. 
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Appendix: Proofs 
 
Proposition 1: 
 
To show existence, we must show that there exists some *δˆ that simultaneously satisfies 
constraints 3. i., 3.ii., and 3.iii.  We can write this as: 
   ( )*ˆ1n N δ= − and  
( ) ( ) ( )* 1ˆ ˆ ˆq Pr Pr Pri i i i q qPε γδ δ δ δ δ − +⎛ ⎞= ≠ ∪ > ∪ <⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ .  Our assumptions imply that each 
of these events is independent, so we can write: 
( ) ( ) ( )*1q 1 1q qPε γθ δ− +⎛ ⎞= − −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
Which simplifies to 
 
 
( )( )
( )( )( )
*
*
1 1
q
1 1P
θ δ ε
θ δ γ ε
⎛ ⎞− −⎜ ⎟= ⎜ ⎟⎡ ⎤− − − −⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠
 
Re-writing our non-negativity constraint iii. in terms of q and substituting x., the 
condition becomes: 
 ( )( )
( )( )
( )( )
( )( )( )
* *
**
ˆ1 1 1
ˆ 1 11
B N c
PB N
δ θ δ ε
θ δ γ εδ γ
⎛ ⎞− − − −⎜ ⎟≥ ⎜ ⎟⎡ ⎤− − − −− + ⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠
 
Note that at *δ = 1, the left hand side is negative and the condition cannot be satisfied.  
Meanwhile, at *ˆ 0δ = , the condition becomes 
( )
( )( )
1( )
( ) 1
B N c
B N P
θ ε
γ θ γ ε
⎛ ⎞−− ≥ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+ − − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠
 
Noting that the right hand side is decreasing in θ, so it will suffice to consider the case 
where θ = 0.  Thus we must have: 
( )
( )
B N c
B N P
ε
γ γ ε
− ≥+ − +  
Since the limit of the left hand side as n goes to infinity is one, and the right hand side 
cannot be greater than one, we have shown that for large enough N there is some *δˆ  at 
which the payoff is non-negative given the resulting equilibrium values of n and q. 
 
Lemma 1: For any allowable parameterization of the model, there is some critical value 
( )0,1Ck ∈   such that for any Ck k≤  the Cooperative Equilibrium exists, while for 
Ck k≥ the Autarky Equilibrium prevails.   
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It follows from Proposition 1 and Assumption 1 that a Cooperative Equilibrium must 
exist for k = 0, thus we must show that there exists some Ck above which there is no 
Cooperative Equilibrium.  Thus we must show that there is no *δˆ that simultaneously 
satisfies constraints 3.i, 3.ii, and 3.iii. 
 
The non-negativity constraint is: 
 
(1 ) ( ) 0q B n q cγ− − − ≥    
 
We consider the case where θ = 1 (i.e., discount factors are observable and there is no 
Default).  Substituting constraints 3.i and 3.ii as well the result from the proof of 
Proposition 3b below that in the θ = 1 case *ˆ
P
εδ = , we have 
 
( )1 1B N k c
P
ε⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞− − ≥⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠  
 
Using Assumption 2, the non-negativity constraint is not satisfied iff 
 
( )1 1 1N k
P
ε⎛ ⎞− − ≤⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
Or 
 
11
1
k
N
P
ε≥ − ⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
 
Since by assumption P ε> , the right hand side is between 0 and 1 and there is some 
( )0,1Ck ∈ that satisfies this requirement.  Thus, the non-negativity constraint cannot be 
satisfied for Ck k≥ in the θ = 1 case.  For other values of θ, note that the payoff cannot 
exceed that of the θ = 1 case, so any Ck k≥ will result in the Autarky Equilibrium for 
these cases as well. 
 
Lemma 2: ( ) ( )B n B n
n N
γ∂ +≤∂ for all 0 n N≤ ≤  is sufficient to guarantee that adding 
Defaulters to the group always reduces the payoff to the Cooperating group members. 
 
Suppose there are n1 Defaulting group members and n2 Cooperating group members.  
We can then write the maximand U as: 
1 11 ( 1 2)
1 2 1 2
n nU B n n c
n n n n
γ⎛ ⎞= − + − −⎜ ⎟+ +⎝ ⎠  
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Now consider the effect of exogenously adding Defaulting group members.  We require 
that the effect of increasing n1 decreases U, so we need to find the conditions under 
which:  
 
0
1
U
n
∂ <∂  
 
Taking the derivative and using the fact that 1
1 2
nq
n n
= + and 1 2N n n= + gives 
( ) ( )1 0B B nq
n N
γ∂ +⎛ ⎞− − <⎜ ⎟∂⎝ ⎠  
Which holds iff 
 
( )B B n
n N
γ∂ +<∂ , as was to be shown 
Proposition 2a: Where θ = 0, Let ( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )1
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
C B N c P B Nk
B N c B N P
ε γ γ ε
ε γ γ ε
− + − − += − − − + − .   For 
1Ck k≤ k a Cooperative Equilibrium exists with group size N, while for 1Ck k> no 
Cooperative Equilibrium exists. 
 
Proposition 2b: Where θ = 0, over the range  1Ck k≤  the threshold indicator *ˆ 0δ =  
 
Since in this case δˆ is a random draw from the population, the only effect of 
increasing *δˆ is to reduce n*, lowering the payoff.  Thus, the payoff is maximized at 
*ˆ 0δ = .    
 
Constraint 3.ii. now becomes: 
 
( ) (1 )1 q qq k k
P
ε γ− += + −  
( )
( )( )
1
1
Pk k
P k
ε
γ ε
+ −= − − −  
 
Substituting into constraint 3.iii and rearranging, we obtain: 
  
( )( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
B N c P B N
k
B N c B N P
ε γ γ ε
ε γ γ ε
− + − − +≤ − − − + −  
 
Thus for k greater than this critical value, the non-negativity constraint is violated and no 
Cooperative Equilibrium exists. 
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Proposition 3a: Where θ = 1, Let ( ) ( )2 11C
Pk B c
P Nε
−⎛ ⎞= − ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
, where B-1 is the inverse 
of B. For 2Ck k≤ , a Cooperative Equilibrium exists with a group size n* that is 
decreasing in k at a rate of 1 N
P
ε⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ .  For 
2Ck k>  no cooperative equilibrium exists. 
 
Proposition 3b: Where θ = 1, over the range 2Ck k≤   the threshold indicator is *ˆ
P
εδ =  
 
First, note that for *ˆ
P
εδ ≥ , q = 0.  Since n* is decreasing *δˆ , the payoff at 
*ˆ
P
εδ = exceeds the payoff for any other *ˆ
P
εδ >  .  Meanwhile, assumption x guarantees 
that   *ˆ
P
εδ ≤ . 
The threshold *ˆ
P
εδ =  gives a value of n of ( )* 1 1n N k
P
ε⎛ ⎞= − −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ .  Using the fact that q = 
0, we can substitute into constraint 3.iii. to obtain: 
 
( )1 1B N k c
P
ε⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞− − ≥⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠  
So that the critical value of k where the payoff becomes negative is 
( ) ( )2 11C
Pk B c
P Nε
−⎛ ⎞= − ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
 
 
Where B-1 is the inverse of B.   
 
We can find the change in the optimal group size as k increases by differentiating n* with 
respect to k: 
 
*
1n N
k P
δ ε
δ
⎛ ⎞= − −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
 
 
Proposition 3c: kC2 > kC1 
 
First note that the first round payoff in the θ = 0 case at 1Ck is zero.  Suppose that in this 
case there are n1 Defaulting group members and n2 Cooperating group members. We can 
then write 
1 11 ( 1 2) 0
1 2 1 2
n nB n n c
n n n n
γ⎛ ⎞− + − − =⎜ ⎟+ +⎝ ⎠ .   
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Now consider the case where θ = 1.  Since all Defaulters are excluded, the payoff at 1Ck is 
( 2)B n c−  
Note that the only difference is that the n1 Defaulters have been excluded.  By 
assumption 2, including Defaulters is always a net loss, which gives us  
1 1( 2) 1 ( 1 2)
1 2 1 2
n nB n c B n n c
n n n n
γ⎛ ⎞− > − + − −⎜ ⎟+ +⎝ ⎠  
Thus, at 1Ck the first round payoff in the θ = 1 case is greater than zero, so there is 
Cooperative Equilibrium at this value of k and the critical value 2Ck at which constraint 
3.iii fails to hold must be greater than 1Ck . 
 
Proposition 4a: Let 3Ck be the value of k such that at the *δˆ that satisfies (4.1), constraint 
(4.i) holds with equality.  For 3Ck k≤ a Cooperative Equilibrium exists with group size n* 
that is weakly decreasing in k. For 3Ck k>  no cooperative equilibrium exists. 
Proposition 4b: Over the range 0 < k < kC3, the threshold indicator is weakly increasing in 
k. 
 
Where 4.i holds with equality, the optimal choice of *δˆ yields zero first round payoff.  
Since an increase in k must increase the number of Defaulters in the community, such an 
increase must either increase the Default rate in the group, reduce the group size as these 
Defaulters are excluded by increasing *δˆ , or both.  Since any of these outcomes would 
reduce the first round payoff, increasing k beyond this point means that the first round 
payoff must be negative and there is no Cooperative Equilibrium. 
 
Proposition 4c: kC2 > kC3 > kC1 
 
The proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 3c. 
31 
 
-BIBLIOGRAPHY- 
 
Ambec, Stefan, and Nicholas Treich (2007) “Roscas as Financial Agreements to Cope 
with Self Control Problems” Journal of Development Economics 82 (1) pp. 120-137 
 
Anderson, Siwan, and Jean-Marie Baland (2002) “The Economics of ROSCAs and 
Intrahousehold Resource Allocation” Quarterly Journal of Economics 117 (3) pp. 963-
965 
 
Anderson, Siwan, Jean-Marie Baland, and Karl Ove Moene (2009) “Enforcement in 
Informal Savings Groups” Journal of Development Economics 90 (1) pp. 14-23 
 
Armendiariz, Beatriz, and Jonathan Morduch (2007)  The Economics of Microfinance 
The MIT Press: Cambridge, MA 
 
Besley, Timothy, Stephen Coate and Glen Loury (1993) American Economic Review 83 
(4) pp. 792-810 
 
Bowles, Samuel, and Herbert Gintis (2002) “Social Capital and Community Governance” 
The Economic Journal 112 pp. F419-F436 
 
Brooks, Nancy (2001) “The Effects of Community Characteristics on 
Community Social Behavior” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 44pp. 249–
267 
 
Case, Anne, Annu Garib, Alicia Mendez, and Analia Olgiati (2008) “Paying the Piper: 
The High Cost of Funerals in South Africa” NBER Working Paper 14456 
 
Chamberlain, Gary (1980) “Analysis of covariance with qualitative data” Review of 
Economic Studies 47(1) pp. 225–238 
 
Collins, Daryl, Jonathan Morduch, Stuart Rutherford and Orlanda Ruthven (2009) 
Portfolios of the Poor: How the World’s Poor Live on $2 a Day Princeton University 
Press: Princeton, NJ 
 
David, Antonio (2007) “HIV/AIDS and Social Capital in a Cross-Section of Countries” 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4263 
 
Dorrington, Rob, Debbie Bradshaw and Debbie Budlender (2002) HIV/AIDS Profile in 
the Provinces of South Africa: Indicators for 2002 Centre for Actuarial Research, 
Medical Research Council and the Actuarial Society of South Africa 
 
Fehr, Ernst, Gachter, Simon, (2000) “Cooperation and punishment in public goods 
experiments” American Economic Review 90 (4), 980–994. 
Bowles, Samuel, and Herbert Gintis (1992) 
 
32 
 
Gugerty, Mary Kay (2007) “You Can’t Save Alone: Commitment in Rotating Savings 
and Credit Associations in Kenya” Economic Development and Cultural Change 51 (2) 
pp. 251-282 
 
Jayne, Thomas, Antony Chapoto, Elizabeth Byron, Mukelabai Ndiyoi, Petan 
Hamazakaza, Suneetha Kadiyala, and Stuart Gillespie (2006) “Community-level Impacts 
of AIDS-Related Mortality: Panel Survey Evidence from Zambia” Review of Agricultural 
Economics 28 (3) pp. 440-457 
 
Maher, M. (1995) “Transaction Cost Economics and Contractual Relations” Cambridge 
Journal of Economics 21(2) pp. 147-170 
 
Miguel, Edward, and Mary Kay Gugerty (2005) “Ethnic diversity, social sanctions, and 
public goods in Kenya” Journal of Public Economics 89 (2005) 2325–2368 
 
 
Roth, Jimmy (1999) “Informal Micro-Finance Schemes: The Case of Funeral Insurance 
in South Africa” Social Finance Unit Working Paper 22, International Labor Office, 
International Labor Organization 
 
Van den Brink, Rogier, and Jean-Paul Chavas (1997) “The Microeconomics of an 
Indigenous African Institution: The Rotating Savings and Credit Association” Economic 
Development and Cultural Change 45 (4) pp. 745-72 
 
Verhoef, Greitje (2001) “Informal Financial Institutions for Survival: African Women 
and Stokvels in Urban South Africa, 1930-1998” Enterprise and Society 2 (2) pp. 259-
296 
 
Wooldridge, Jeffrey (2001) Economic Analysis of Cross-Sectional and Panel Data The 
MIT Press: Cambridge, MA 
 
33 
 
Figure 1. Threshold *δˆ  and Default rate q  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Optimal Group Size  
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
 
 1993-1998 1998-2004 
Prime age population   
Average (Std. dev.) 70.9 (39.0) 86.6 (48.5) 
Minimum 10 14 
Maximum 180 214 
25th percentile 38 44 
50th percentile 67 80 
 75th percentile 92 123 
   
Prime Age Mortality Rate   
Average (Std. dev.) 1.6% (1.97) 4.5% (3.26) 
Minimum 0.0% 0.0% 
Maximum 8.0% 13.0% 
25th percentile 0.0% 1.7% 
50th percentile 1.0% 4.6% 
 75th percentile 3.0% 6.9% 
   
Cluster level per capita income growth -4.3% 32.6% 
Household level per capita income growth -14.1% 5.3% 
Change in household size 0.09 -0.82 
Incidence of Prime Age Mortality 12.0% 29.4% 
Membership in:   
     Stokvels 23.1% 22.6% 
     Burial Societies 38.1% 32.3% 
     Non-Financial Secular Groups 20.2% 26.2% 
     Religious Groups 52.3% 96.2% 
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Table 2. Household Level Empirical Results 
 
Group Type Stokvel Burial Society Non-Fin. Secular Religious 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Model CL LP CL LP CL LP CL LP 
Cluster level mortality -5.986 -1.128 -2.565 -0.623 2.437 0.213 28.793 -0.602 
(2.31)** (2.79)* -0.88 -1.21 0.77 0.35 (3.06)* -1.11 
Cluster level per capita exp. gr. 0.172 0.021 -0.12 -0.038 0.369 0.028 3.94 -0.027 
(0.65) (0.47) (0.4) (0.7) (1.07) (0.42) (2.95)* (-0.48) 
Change in household size -0.014 -0.002 0.05 0.006 0.008 0.001 -0.02 0.002 
(-0.33) (-0.44) (2.66)* (1.70) (0.33) (0.21) (-0.72 (0.39) 
Household per capita exp. gr. 0.653 0.081 0.317 0.054 0.583 0.079 0.373 0.069 
(4.78)* (4.76)* (2.50)** (2.34)** (3.06)* (3.52)* (2.32)** (3.03)* 
Household prime age mortality 0.046 0.02 -0.272 -0.026 -0.19 -0.059 1.226 0.014 
(0.17) (0.54) (-1.18) (-0.66) (-0.74) (-1.41) (3.23)* (0.4) 
Year 0.011 0.02 0.036 0.476 
(0.33) (0.62) (0.92) (13.25)*
Constant 0.279 0.411 0.214 0.55 
(15.69)* (16.90)* (7.66)* (20.68)*
Observations 392 1346 466 1346 460 1346 630 1346 
R-squared 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.46 
** significant at 5%; * significant at 1% 
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Table 3. Community Level Fixed Effects Results 
 
Group type Stokvel 
(9) 
Cluster level mortality 20.94 
(1.00) 
Cluster level per capita exp. gr. 2.125 
(1.14) 
Year 1.104 
(0.62) 
Constant 2.926 
(3.70)* 
Observations 124 
R-squared 0.08 
 
